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WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU’RE 
EXPECTING: FETAL PROTECTION LAWS 
THAT STRIP AWAY THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF PREGNANT WOMEN 
JENNIFER HENRICKS* 
Abstract: Many states have enacted fetal protection laws as a way of promoting 
fetal health and combatting the problem of in utero fetal drug abuse. These laws, 
however, unduly compromise the constitutional rights of pregnant women, impli-
cating a woman’s rights to privacy, due process, and equal protection under the 
laws. Additionally, such laws compromise both maternal health and fetal health 
by discouraging at-risk pregnant women from seeking medical attention. Requir-
ing procedural protections before the enforcement of fetal protection laws may 
mitigate the laws’ extensive constitutional problems. Additionally, enacting pro-
grams that provide pregnant women with positive incentives to promote fetal 
health throughout their pregnancies would be more effective in promoting fetal 
health than fetal protection laws. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 2, 2013, twenty-eight-year-old Alicia Beltran went to a clinic at 
St. Joseph’s Hospital in Wisconsin for her first prenatal visit.1 Then fourteen 
weeks pregnant, Alicia divulged a prior addiction to the painkiller Percocet 
when describing her medical history to the physician’s assistant.2 Alicia ex-
plained how she had become addicted the year before her pregnancy, but 
“willed herself” to stop using Percocet in November 2012.3 Because she could 
not afford Suboxone, a prescription drug widely used to treat drug addictions, 
she acquired some from a friend and weaned herself off of the Suboxone three 
days before her scheduled prenatal visit.4 The skeptical physician’s assistant 
offered to write Alicia a Suboxone prescription, suggesting that she resume 
taking the medicine.5 Alicia declined because she had already ceased her Sub-
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–
2015. 
 1 Erik Eckholm, Case Explores Rights of Fetus Versus Mother, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2013, at A1. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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oxone use and “[didn’t] want to go back on it.”6 A urine test conducted that 
day confirmed what Alicia had told the physician’s assistant, finding traces of 
Suboxone in her system but no signs of any other drugs.7 
Two weeks later, a social worker arrived unannounced at Alicia’s home, 
telling Alicia that if she still refused to resume taking Suboxone, a court would 
order her to do so.8 Upset, Alicia again refused to take the unnecessary medi-
cation.9 On July 18, 2013, Alicia was transported in handcuffs to St. Joseph’s 
Hospital where she was forced to submit to a medical examination.10 She was 
then taken to a holding cell, and brought before a family court commissioner in 
shackles.11 Alicia’s requests for a lawyer were denied, despite the fact that the 
court had appointed her fetus a legal guardian.12 A Wisconsin law, colloquially 
referred to as the “cocaine mom” act13 gives the state the authority to forcibly 
confine pregnant women that use illegal substances or alcohol “to a severe de-
gree” when there is “a substantial risk” of endangering the health of the fetus 
while in utero and after birth.14 Despite multiple urine tests confirming that 
Alicia had stopped using Percocet, she was confined to a drug treatment center 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. When tested two weeks later, Alicia no longer had any traces of Suboxone in her system. Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 Id.; Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Beltran v. Loenish, 2:2013cv01101, at 9 (E.D. 
Wis. Sept. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus]; see WIS. STAT. § 48.133 
(2009–2010). 
 11 Eckholm, supra note 1; see § 48.133; Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 10, at 
9. 
 12 Eckholm, supra note 1; see § 48.133. The denial of Alicia’s requests for a lawyer was also in 
violation of a Wisconsin state law that guarantees that, when a petition is brought under the fetal pro-
tection statute, and contested by the expectant mother, “no expectant mother may be placed outside of 
her home unless the expectant mother is represented by counsel at the fact-finding hearing and subse-
quent proceedings.” See WIS. STAT. § 48.23 (2009–2010). 
 13 See § 48.133; Eckholm, supra note 1. The Wisconsin statute provides that, 
 The court has exclusive original jurisdiction over an unborn child alleged to be in 
need of protection or services which can be ordered by the court whose expectant 
mother habitually lacks self-control in the use of alcohol beverages, controlled sub-
stances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree, to the extent that 
there is a substantial risk that the physical health of the unborn child, and of the child 
when born, will be seriously affected or endangered unless the expectant mother re-
ceives prompt and adequate treatment for that habitual lack of self-control. The court 
also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the expectant mother of an unborn child de-
scribed in this section. 
§ 48.133. 
 14 WIS. STAT. § 48.23; Eckholm, supra note 1. 
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for seventy-eight days under the threat of jail time if she refused to comply 
with their treatment directives.15 
Bolstering the state’s case against Alicia was the statement of an obstetri-
cian at the clinic Alicia visited, stating that Alicia “openly admitted” to taking 
opiates while pregnant, and that she “exhibits lack of self-control . . . ” adding 
that “[t]he child’s life depends on action in this case.”16 The obstetrician writ-
ing this statement, however, never personally met with or examined Alicia.17 
The doctor who did examine Alicia immediately following her arrest declared 
both Alicia and her pregnancy healthy, declined to conduct a drug test, and 
stated, “that he considered in-patient treatment to be unnecessary in this 
case.”18 
After her court-ordered stay at a drug treatment center, Alicia was allowed 
to return home.19 Then six months pregnant, she spent the last portion of her 
pregnancy in fear that government officials would return once her baby was 
born and intervene in her relationship with her child.20 In addition, as a result 
of her confinement, Alicia lost her job, forcing her to spend her third trimester 
looking for temporary work rather than enjoying what she believed was “sup-
posed to be the happiest part of [her] pregnancy[.]”21 
The Wisconsin law that forcibly confined Alicia to a drug treatment facili-
ty is not unique.22 Oklahoma and Minnesota have similar laws that specifically 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Eckholm, supra note 1. Alicia left the facility on October 4, 2013, when the center sent her 
home. Id. While in custody, Alicia filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate re-
lease from custody in the Federal District Court of the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Application for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 10, at 9–10. In her petition, she alleged that the Wisconsin statute 
used to confine her violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and her constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 
11–13. Alicia also alleged that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment, the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel. Id. at 14–15. As of publication, the court has not yet ruled on the petition. See Beltran v. Loenish, 
2:2013-cv-01101-CNC (E.D. Wis., Sept. 30, 2013). 
 16 Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 10, at 9. 
 19 Eckholm, supra, note 1. Even though she never tested positive for any drug other than Subox-
one, the recommendations of the obstetrician at the clinic that Alicia visited persuaded the court that 
Alicia needed to be confined under Wisconsin’s law. Id. Alicia was threatened with incarceration if 
she refused to comply with the treatment program and thus remained at the facility until the treatment 
center sent her home. Id. 
 20 See id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 253B.065 (2012); Oklahoma Prenatal Addiction Act, OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-546.1–.5 (West 2004); WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (2009–2010). 
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empower authorities “to confine pregnant women for substance abuse.”23 Oth-
er states draw upon child-protection laws, civil confinements, or even criminal 
laws to protect the fetus from in utero harm.24 The effect of these laws is to 
punish pregnant women for using drugs or force them into treatment pro-
grams.25 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
has stated that incarcerating or threatening to incarcerate pregnant women is an 
ineffective step in reducing the rates of drug and alcohol abuse among preg-
nant women.26 Instead, the ACOG reports that these procedures discourage 
women from seeking the prenatal care that would greatly reduce the negative 
impact their substance abuse would have on their fetus.27 
Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of fetal rights, the development 
of the maternal-fetal conflict, and the introduction of fetal protection laws. Part 
II analyzes the modern plight of pregnant women under these laws, identifying 
how these laws infringe on the constitutional rights of pregnant women, com-
promise their maternal health, and conflict with decades of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence. Part III details a set of statutorily defined procedures and re-
quirements that could be implemented to prevent fetal protection laws from 
being both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, and discusses an alternative 
method of achieving the goal of promoting fetal health in the absence of, or in 
lieu of, fetal protection laws. 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Eckholm, supra note 1; see MINN. STAT. § 253B.065(c) (“The court may order early interven-
tion treatment if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a pregnant woman is a chemi-
cally dependent person.”); Oklahoma Prenatal Addiction Act § 1-546.1(B) (“[I]n some instances it 
may be necessary to use the authority of the state to intervene for the purpose of preserving and pro-
tecting the health and well-being of the child.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-70 (2011) (instruct-
ing that a “petition [for involuntary commitment] shall allege that the person is an alcoholic or drug 
abuser who habitually lacks self-control as to the use of alcoholic beverages or other drugs and . . . [i]s 
pregnant and abusing alcohol or drugs”). 
 24 See Krista Stone-Manista, Comment, Protecting Pregnant Women: A Guide to Successfully 
Challenging Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions of Pregnant Drug Addicts, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 823, 824 (2009); Eckholm, supra note 1. For example, in January 2013, the Alabama Su-
preme Court upheld the practice of applying a chemical endangerment law, enacted for the purpose of 
protecting children, from the moment of conception. Ex Parte Ankrom, 143 So. 3d 58, 73 (Ala. 2013), 
withdrawn from bound volume (including unborn fetus within meaning of word “child” in Alabama 
child endangerment statute). But see State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526, 528 (N.D. 2013) (declining to 
apply North Dakota child endangerment statute to unborn fetus). 
 25 Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 26 The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Committee Opinion No. 473: Substance 
Abuse Reporting and Pregnancy: The Role of the Obstetrician–Gynecologist, 117 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 200, 200 (2011); Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 27 The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 26, at 200; Eckholm, supra note 1. 
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF FETAL RIGHTS, THE MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICT, 
AND THE INTRODUCTION OF FETAL PROTECTION LAWS 
Historically, a fetus was viewed under the law as an inseparable part of a 
pregnant woman, with no independent legal rights.28 There were always some 
limited exceptions to this rule, however, that granted the fetus limited rights in 
certain contexts.29 These traditional exceptions typically required a fetus to be 
born alive, although as the fields of science and medicine have progressed, 
many jurisdictions have turned away from this requirement.30 The modern 
trend is to recognize rights of an in utero fetus independent of its mother.31 
Under a system where both mother and fetus have independent rights, when a 
pregnant woman’s wishes conflict with the medical advice of her prenatal care 
provider, a maternal-fetal conflict arises.32 To address this conflict, a majority 
of states have enacted fetal protection laws to offer varying degrees of protec-
tion for the developing fetus.33 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973); Jean Reith Schroedel et al., Women’s Rights and 
Fetal Personhood in Criminal Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89, 94 (2000); Scott R. DeBonis, 
Comment, The Fetal-Maternal Conflict: Judicial Resolution Based Upon Constitutional Rights, 22 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 479, 487 (1995); Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts 
with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 599 
(1986); Nora Christie Sandstad, Note, Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Feminist 
Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women’s Rights During Pregnancy, 26 LAW & INEQ. 171, 175 
(2008). 
 29 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (2013) (allowing children unborn at the time of the dece-
dent’s death to inherit as if alive in the lifetime of the decedent, if born within 10 lunar months of the 
decedent’s death); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11, 12 (Idaho 1982) (allowing claim for death of an 
unborn yet viable fetus under Idaho’s wrongful death statute). 
 30 Compare Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140, 142–43 (D.D.C. 1946) (allowing a cause of 
action on behalf of a child, once born alive, for prenatal injuries inflicted upon the child when it was a 
viable fetus), with DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 490 (N.C. 1987) (allowing recovery under 
North Carolina’s Wrongful Death Act for the death of a viable yet unborn fetus), Salazar v. St. Vin-
cent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826, 829–30 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (including a viable fetus within the definition 
of “person” in New Mexico’s wrongful death statute), and Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: 
The Case Against the Criminalization of “Fetal Abuse,” 101 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1004 (1988) [here-
inafter Maternal Rights]. 
 31 See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 461 (Ga. 1981) (uphold-
ing trial court’s decision to order a Caesarean section performed against the wishes of the mother); 
DeBonis, supra note 28, at 487. But see In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990) (determining 
that trial court’s order of a forced Caesarean section was in error). 
 32 See Margo Kaplan, “A Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant Women’s Right to Refuse Medical 
Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 182 (2010) (describing court or-
dered Caesarean sections against the wishes of the mother); DeBonis, supra note 28, at 479–81 (de-
scribing court ordered Caesarean sections against the wishes of the mother); see, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2010) (“A person may not withdraw or withhold life-sustaining 
treatment . . . from a pregnant patient.”). 
 33 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 253B.065 (2012); Oklahoma Prenatal Addiction Act, OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-546.1–.5 (West 2004); WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (2009–2010); see also Shona B. Glink, 
Note, The Prosecution of Maternal Fetal Abuse: Is This the Answer?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 546 
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A. Traditional View of Fetal Rights 
Fetal rights are a relatively recent development in American jurispru-
dence.34 In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that “the unborn 
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.”35 The 
exceptions to this general rule give fetuses limited rights in certain contexts; 
for example, for inheritance purposes, a fetus that is subsequently born alive 
has a right to inherit as if the fetus were alive from the moment of concep-
tion.36 In family law, Texas allows for the filing of suits to terminate parental 
rights before the birth of the fetus, and Louisiana recognizes proof of parent-
age, with subsequent rights to heirship and support, as a property right of an 
unborn child. 37 
With regard to tort claims, the first recovery for in utero harm was award-
ed in 1946.38 Since then, courts have heard claims regarding pre-birth injuries 
in tort contexts such as parental negligence, wrongful life, and medical mal-
practice.39 Still, these exceptions traditionally hinged on a live birth occurring, 
                                                                                                                           
(using child abuse laws, controlled substance laws, usage laws, and homicide statutes to target the 
behaviors of pregnant women). 
 34 DeBonis, supra note 28, at 488; Johnsen, supra note 28, at 599; Sandstad, supra note 28, at 
175. Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 (2013) (a fetus not born alive has never existed as a per-
son, “except for purposes of actions resulting from its wrongful death”), and Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 
(acknowledging that the unborn had not been legally recognized as persons), with DiDonato, 358 
S.E.2d at 490 (allowing recovery under North Carolina’s Wrongful Death Act for the death of a viable 
yet unborn fetus), and Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 461 (upholding the trial court’s decision to order a 
Caesarean section performed against the wishes of the mother). 
 35 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
 36 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (2013) (allowing children unborn at the time of the dece-
dent’s death to inherit as if alive in the lifetime of the decedent if born within ten lunar months of the 
decedent’s death); Volk, 651 P.2d at 12 (allowing claim for death of an unborn yet viable fetus under 
Idaho’s wrongful death statute); Nelson v. Galveston, 14 S.W. 1021, 1023 (Tex. 1890) (granting an 
unborn child the same rights to damages from deceased father’s lawsuit as a child born at the time of 
the involved accident); DeBonis, supra note 28, at 488. 
 37 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.102 (West 2014); Malek v. Yekani-Fard, 422 So.2d 1151, 
1153 (La. 1982). 
 38 James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment for Maternal 
Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (1991); see Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140, 142. The 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia allowed recovery on behalf of an infant, born alive, 
for injuries sustained while in utero. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 142. The court reasoned that if the child 
“has no right of action for prenatal injuries, we have a wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy 
. . . .” Id. at 141. 
 39 Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488–89 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that ge-
netically disabled child had valid wrongful life claim); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 
1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977) (holding that prematurely born child had valid negligence claim regarding a 
blood transfusion occurring prior to the child’s conception); Denison, supra note 38, at 1113 (citing 
Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 869–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (considering negligence and medi-
cal malpractice claims as a result of medicine taken by mother while pregnant that resulted in brown 
and discolored teeth for her child)). 
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meaning that a fetus that was not born alive would be precluded from tort re-
covery.40 Most jurisdictions have now changed this rule to allow for the initia-
tion of wrongful death suits on behalf of the fetus.41 In such cases, recovery is 
typically limited to situations where the fetus was medically viable at the time 
the tort occurred.42 These cases, however, are most often viewed as a way for 
the parents to vindicate their interest, rather than recognizing the fetus as a per-
son with interests independent of the parents.43 
B. Modern Approach to Fetal Rights 
As science has advanced, courts have granted to an in utero fetus rights 
independent of its mother.44 Beginning with Roe, the Supreme Court first iden-
tified a government interest in protecting the health of a fetus.45 Under Roe’s 
trimester system, the regulation of abortion was permissible only when nar-
rowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest, with the interest of the 
fetus not outweighing the rights of the mother until the third trimester.46 The 
Supreme Court overruled this trimester system in Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey, establishing the modern principle that the state has a legitimate interest in 
protecting the health of the mother and the life of the fetus from the beginning 
of the pregnancy.47 Still, Casey dictates that a state cannot prohibit pre-
                                                                                                                           
 40 Maternal Rights, supra note 30, at 1004. But see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 (2013) (a fetus 
not born alive has never existed as a person, “except for purposes of actions resulting from its wrong-
ful death”). 
 41 See, e.g., DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 490 (allowing recovery under North Carolina’s Wrongful 
Death Act for the death of a viable yet unborn fetus); Salazar, 619 P.2d at 830 (including a viable 
fetus within the definition of “person” in New Mexico’s wrongful death statute); Maternal Rights, 
supra note 30, at 1004. 
 42 See DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 490; Salazar, 619 P.2d at 830; Maternal Rights, supra note 30, at 
1004. 
 43 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162; DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 490. Because the fetus was not born alive as 
a result of the alleged tort, these claims allow parents to vindicate their interests affected by the loss of 
a medically viable fetus. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
 44 See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 461 (upholding trial court’s decision to order a Caesarean section 
performed against the wishes of the mother); DeBonis, supra note 28, at 487. But see In re A.C., 573 
A.2d at 1243–44 (determining that trial court’s order of a forced Caesarean section was in error). 
 45 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162; DeBonis, supra note 27, at 287. 
 46 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64. Reflective of historical abortion laws that made distinctions based 
on quickening, Roe established a trimester system that dictated the balance between maternal and fetal 
rights. Id. at 163. Under this framework, during the first trimester a woman has an unfettered right to 
abort the pregnancy. Id. During the second trimester, the state has a legitimate and important interest 
in the health of the mother, and can regulate abortion only if the regulation is designed for the health 
of the mother. Id. During the third trimester, the point at which the fetus has attained viability under 
the Roe decision, the state has an interest in protecting the fetus and can prohibit abortion, so long as 
there is an exception for instances when abortion would be necessary to protect the health or life of the 
mother. Id. at 163–64. 
 47 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 873 (1992). 
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viability abortion because, at that stage, the rights of the mother outweigh the 
interests of the government in protecting the health of the fetus.48 Even after 
fetal viability, where the state may legally choose to restrict abortions, any re-
striction must maintain an exception for pregnancies that endanger the life of 
the mother.49 Thus, at all stages of the pregnancy, the rights of the mother must 
be balanced against any rights that the fetus may have—or any government 
interest in protecting the fetus—and the health of the mother will always trump 
any such fetal interests.50 
Since the Supreme Court established fetal rights in Roe and reaffirmed 
these rights in Casey, the modern conflict has been over finding the right bal-
ance between mother and fetus, namely how much control a pregnant woman 
should have over decisions she makes during her pregnancy.51 Advancements 
in medical technology have made it possible for doctors to treat a fetus direct-
ly, while still in utero, rather than limiting the promotion of fetal health to fo-
cusing on maintaining maternal health.52 Beginning with the first fetal surgery 
in the early 1980s, which involved draining the urinary tract of the fetus by 
inserting a needle through the abdomen of the mother and into the fetus, medi-
cal science has developed increasingly more significant and invasive proce-
dures.53 In some instances, advanced technology has led to court-ordered med-
ical procedures to promote fetal health in utero, over the wishes of the moth-
er.54 Some states have codified these developments, including twelve states 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. at 846. Viability is defined as the interim point, between conception and birth, where the 
fetus is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 
160. At the time of Roe, viability was considered to be twenty-eight weeks, but at the time of Casey, 
viability was placed earlier in the pregnancy, at twenty-three to twenty-four weeks. Casey, 505 U.S. at 
860; Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. Science, rather than the courts, determines the definition of viability, and 
the definition has changed and may continue to change as science progresses. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 
860. 
 49 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 50 See id; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64; Sandstad, supra note 28, at 177. 
 51 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; Roe, 410 U.S. at 162; DeBonis, supra note 28, at 483. 
 52 DeBonis, supra note 28, at 479. 
 53 Id. at 482–83. Later procedures performed on fetuses involved removing the fetus completely 
from the womb, operating on the fetus, and then returning the fetus to the womb. Id. 
 54 Id. at 480–81; see also Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 461 (upholding trial court’s decision to order a 
Caesarean section performed against the wishes of the mother). But see In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 
2d 326, 330, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (affirming lower court’s decision denying state’s motion to force 
performance of Caesarean section); In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1237 (determining that trial court’s order 
of a forced Caesarean section was in error); Kaplan, supra note 32, at 174 n.109 (citing New Jersey 
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.V., 889 A.2d 1153, 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005) (inter-
preting the New Jersey constitution to uphold right of pregnant women to refuse medical treatment 
“even at the risk of her death or the termination of her pregnancy”)). 
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that have statutes automatically invalidating a pregnant woman’s advanced 
healthcare directives.55 
A woman’s right to decide whether to deliver her baby vaginally or via 
Caesarean section has also played out in the courtroom.56 In the majority of 
cases, natural birth is not determined to be detrimental to the fetus until the 
mother is already in labor.57 When the mother refuses to allow the doctors to 
perform a Caesarean section, a fetal-maternal conflict arises.58 Because of the 
pressing time requirements of these cases, laboring mothers are appointed 
counsel quickly, with no time for their attorney to investigate the constitutional 
rights embroiled within the issue or even meet with the mother.59 Courts face 
similar time constraints, and typically “err on the side of a healthy baby.”60 Pro-
cedures are performed within hours of the issuance of the court order, meaning 
that appellate review is not an option until after the procedure is performed and 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2010) (“A person may not 
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment . . . from a pregnant patient.”). Marlise Munoz was 
kept on life support after collapsing at her home when she was fourteen weeks pregnant on November 
26, 2013. Manny Fernandez, Pregnant Woman’s Life Support Ordered Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2014, at A1. On January 24, 2014, a judge ordered the hospital to take Marlise off of life-support. Id. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that clear and convincing evidence of a person’s 
wishes can be required before life-sustaining support is withdrawn, statutes similar to the one in Texas 
do not allow for the withdrawal of life-sustaining support regardless of how much evidence is provid-
ed of the woman’s wishes. See § 166.049; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 
(1990). 
 56 See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 461 (upholding trial court’s decision to order a Caesarean section 
performed against the wishes of the mother); DeBonis, supra note 28, at 480–81. But see In re A.C., 
573 A.2d at 1237 (holding that trial court’s order of a forced Caesarean section was in error); In re 
Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d at 330, 335 (affirming lower court’s decision denying state’s motion to 
force performance of Caesarean section). 
 57 DeBonis, supra note 28, at 480. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. Because the women are in labor and unable to be present at the hearing, their need for ade-
quate representation is even more pressing. See id.; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 
(1970) (holding that welfare recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney, if desired, for a pre-
termination hearing). “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel.” Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)). In contrast, the fetus has guaranteed representation through the state actor 
petitioning for performance of the Caesarean section. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d at 328 
(fetus appointed guardian ad litem); Eckholm, supra note 1 (fetus appointed counsel). 
 60 DeBonis, supra note 28, at 480–81. “In eighty-eight percent of known cases, court orders for 
Caesarean sections were obtained in less than six hours, with nineteen percent being obtained in one 
hour or less.” Id. at 492. Overriding the mother’s wishes and performing a Caesarean section exposes 
the woman to an invasive and major abdominal surgery, with a much longer recovery time than a 
natural vaginal delivery and a risk to the pregnant woman’s life that is four to five times greater. 
Kaplan, supra note 32, at 182. Ten percent of patients who undergo a Caesarean section will require a 
blood transfusion for excessive hemorrhaging, and women who undergo a Caesarean section will 
often require a Caesarean section in any future pregnancies. Id. at 182–83. 
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the issue has become moot.61 In the rare cases where the decisions were re-
viewed by an appellate court, these courts have split over deciding whether a 
physical intrusion into the mother’s body for the sake of the fetus is justified.62 
In a case with highly uncommon circumstances, a pregnant woman was in-
formed that she would need to deliver via Caesarean section several weeks be-
fore going into labor, allowing the Illinois Appellate Court enough time to re-
view the case prior to the performance of the Caesarean section.63 The court 
refused to employ a balancing test, holding that “a woman’s competent choice 
to refuse medical treatment as invasive as a cesarean [sic] section during preg-
nancy must be honored, even in circumstances where the choice may be harm-
ful to her fetus.”64 Both mother and baby were healthy, after a natural deliv-
ery.65 
Advancements in medical technology have also made it possible for doc-
tors to have a clearer understanding of the types of activities that pregnant 
women engage in that are correlated with birth defects or other health conse-
quences for the fetus.66 Traditionally, doctors have provided pregnant women 
with a list of recommendations and restrictions, encouraging them to eat cer-
tain foods while staying away from substances that would be harmful to the 
developing fetus.67 States such as Wisconsin have gone one step farther and 
                                                                                                                           
 61 DeBonis, supra note 28, at 481; see In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1237 (vacating trial court’s deci-
sion ordering performance of the Caesarean section months after the procedure was performed and 
both the mother and fetus died as a result). 
 62 See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 461 (upholding a Caesarean section performed against the moth-
er’s wishes). But see In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1237, 1241 (finding trial court’s order of a forced Caesar-
ean section was in error after procedure performed and both mother and fetus died); In re Baby Boy 
Doe, 632 N.E. 2d at 330, 335 (denying state’s motion to force the performance of Caesarean section). 
 63 See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 327, 329. Doe was informed at thirty-five weeks of 
gestation that her viable fetus was receiving insufficient oxygen and the safest option for the fetus was 
to perform a Caesarean section or induce labor. Id. at 327. In an emergency hearing before the Illinois 
Circuit Court, the court denied the state’s request for a court order requiring Doe to undergo an emer-
gency Caesarean section to deliver the fetus. Id. at 327–28. Three days later, an Illinois Appellate 
Court affirmed this decision. Id. at 329. 
 64 Id. at 326. 
 65 Id. at 329. Although somewhat underweight, Doe’s baby boy appeared to be normal and 
healthy after a non-induced vaginal delivery. Id. The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of cer-
tiorari. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3574 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1994) 
(No. 93-7437). Scholars highlight this case as an example of the “inherently imprecise” nature of 
medicine, with risks of potential harm to the fetus and the need for court-ordered intervention often 
overestimated by physicians. Kaplan, supra note 32, at 170. In six of the twenty-one cases reported, as 
of 1987, where court orders compelling treatment of pregnant women were sought, doctors incorrectly 
assessed the potential harm that would occur to the fetus. Id. at 171 n.103 (citing Robin M. Trindel, 
Comment, Fetal Interests vs. Maternal Rights: Is the State Going Too Far?, 24 AKRON L. REV. 743, 
757 (1991)). 
 66 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1110–11. 
 67 See id.; see also The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions: Nutrition During Pregnancy, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY (Sept. 2013), 
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codified some of these recommendations, namely those involving alcohol and 
drug use, into mandates that a mother now must follow under so-called “fetal 
protection laws.”68 
C. Development of Fetal Protection Laws 
Statutes used to protect fetuses fall into two general categories.69 The first 
category contains statutes specifically enacted to protect the fetus from acts of 
violence.70 These acts are largely designed to target fetal homicide and other 
similar acts of violence against the fetus, or acts of violence against pregnant 
women that result in harm to the fetus.71 Historically under American common 
law, for a fetus to be “murdered,” the fetus needed to be born alive and subse-
quently die because of injuries sustained in utero.72 Currently, the majority of 
jurisdictions—including the federal government—no longer require the fetus 
to be born alive for the fetus to be considered a victim of violence.73 Some 
states have expanded their statutory definitions of “victims” or “persons” to 
include fetuses, while other states have enacted separate feticide laws.74 Cur-
                                                                                                                           
http://www.acog.org/~/media/For%20Patients/faq001.pdf?dmc=1&ts=201 40226T1155441611 [here-
inafter Nutrition During Pregnancy] (recommending pregnant women ingest daily prenatal vitamins 
but avoid foods such as swordfish and cold cuts). 
 68 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (2009–2010). 
 69 See, e.g., Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012) (codifying 
federal law enacted specifically for the protection of the fetus from acts of violence); Glink, supra 
note 33, at 546 (using child abuse laws, controlled substance laws, usage laws, and homicide statutes 
to target the behaviors of pregnant women). 
 70 See, e.g., Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 § 2. 
 71 See id.; Jennifer A. Brobst, The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of Violence Act in 
North Carolina, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127, 135 (2006). 
 72 See Brobst, supra note 71, at 133. Being “born alive” typically required the fetus to engage in 
some activity, such as breathing independently after the cutting of the umbilical cord, that demonstrat-
ed the existence of the fetus separate from the mother. Id. Pregnant women were rarely prosecuted for 
causing or contributing to the death of the injured fetus under these born alive laws. Id. at 133–34. 
 73 See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 § 2 (federal statute making it a separate offense to 
cause death or bodily injury to a fetus in utero). Under the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, the pun-
ishment for causing death or bodily injury to a fetus is the same as the punishment for the harm or 
death that occurred to the pregnant woman, regardless of whether the perpetrator had knowledge of 
the pregnancy. Id. When a perpetrator intentionally kills or attempts to kill a fetus, punishment is 
equated with the punishment for “intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being.” Id.; see 
also MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (LexisNexis 2014) (criminal liability for murder or man-
slaughter of a viable fetus); Brobst, supra note 71, at 140. Some states limit their definition of “vic-
tim” to viable fetuses, while other states protect fetuses from the moment of conception. Id. 
 74 See Brobst, supra note 71, at 136 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (2014) (Georgia feticide 
statute)); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-4001, -4006 (2014) (including a fetus as a victim of murder and 
manslaughter, respectively); see also Sandstad, supra note 28, at 183 (naming Missouri, Louisiana, 
and Texas among states expanding definition of “person” to include fetus). 
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rently, thirty-eight states enforce some form of fetal homicide laws.75 Four 
states continue to follow the common law “born alive” rule.76 
The second category of laws utilized for fetal protection target the behav-
iors of pregnant women that may harm the fetus.77 Many states use existing 
laws to try and accomplish this goal, painting pregnant women as perpetrators 
against their fetuses.78 Child abuse laws,79 child endangerment laws,80 con-
trolled substance statutes,81 usage laws,82 and even homicide statutes83 have 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Ruth Graham, Whose Rights?, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2014, at K1; National Conference of State 
Legislatures, Fetal Homicide State Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2013), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx [hereinafter Fetal Homicide State Laws] 
(listing the states with fetal protection laws). Typically passed after a highly publicized tragedy, these 
laws are usually framed as a means of protecting pregnant women from acts of violence. See Graham, 
supra. Twenty-three of these states clearly include a fetus as a victim of homicide from the point of con-
ception. Fetal Homicide State Laws, supra. 
 76 See Brobst, supra note 71, at 143; Fetal Homicide State Laws, supra note 75. The four states 
are Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. See Brobst, supra note 71, at 143; Fetal Hom-
icide State Laws, supra note 75. 
 77 See, e.g., Glink, supra note 33, at 546 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law Co-op. 1976 & 
Supp. 1990) (considering laws used to charge woman when urine tested positive for cocaine immedi-
ately after she delivered her child)); Sandstad, supra note 28, at 179–80 (discussing the laws used to 
charge woman who was four months pregnant seeking medical treatment for domestic violence inju-
ries when tests showed increased blood alcohol level). 
 78 Glink, supra note 33, at 546 (using child abuse laws, controlled substance laws, usage laws, 
and homicide statutes to target the behaviors of pregnant women); Sandstad, supra note 27 at 179–80 
(using child endangerment laws and child abuse laws to prosecute women for drug use during preg-
nancy); Stone-Manista, supra note 24, at 825, 829 (using child endangerment laws and controlled 
substance statutes to prosecute women for drug use during pregnancy). Between 1985 and 2000, thir-
ty-four states prosecuted pregnant women for “fetal abuse” under a variety of criminal statutes. 
Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 102. 
 79 Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 94; Glink, supra note 33, at 546 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-7-50 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1990) (considering laws used to charge woman when urine 
tested positive for cocaine immediately after she delivered her child)); Sandstad, supra note 28, at 
179–80 (discussing laws used to charge woman who was four months pregnant seeking medical 
treatment for domestic violence injuries when tests showed increased blood alcohol level). “Although 
some family courts, in the noncriminal context, hold that the presence of illegal substances in the 
bloodstream or urine of a newborn constitutes per se neglect, these courts are ruling on the custody of 
the child and not the criminal liability of the mother.” Glink, supra note 33, at 549, 551. 
 80 Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 94; Sandstad, supra note 28, at 180–82; Stone-Manista, su-
pra note 24, at 825. 
 81 Glink, supra note 33, at 549; Stone-Manista, supra note 24, at 829; see Johnson v. State, 602 
So.2d. 1288, 1297 (Fla. 1992) (overturning woman’s conviction for delivering controlled substances 
to minors because she transferred illegal drugs to her fetus via the umbilical cord); Patrick Reardon, 
Grand Jury Won’t Indict Mother in Baby’s Drug Death, CHI. TRIB. (May 27, 1989), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-05-27/news/8902040602_1_indict-grand-jury-perinatal-addiction-
research (noting court’s refusal to indict woman on charges of involuntary manslaughter and delivery 
of a controlled substance for use of cocaine while pregnant that resulted in fetus’s death after birth). 
 82 See Glink, supra note 33, at 551. Although only existing in a minority of states, these statutes 
make the mere presence of drugs in the bloodstream of an individual a crime. Id. As applied to preg-
nant women, presence of illegal drugs in a newborn’s bloodstream would be enough for a conviction. 
Id. 
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been applied to pregnant women for actions taken while pregnant in the name 
of fetal protection.84 Scholars criticize such statutory interpretation that in-
cludes fetuses as potential victims as an abuse of judicial discretion, raising 
both constitutional and jurisdictional issues.85 Some state appellate courts 
agree and have struck down convictions of pregnant women based on broad 
statutory interpretation, although other state appellate courts continue to sup-
port prosecution under these laws.86 
States such as Wisconsin have enacted statutes specifically designed to 
protect the fetus by targeting the behavior of pregnant women.87 These statutes 
specifically created for fetal protection give states expansive jurisdiction over 
fetuses while still in utero.88 Under the Wisconsin law, the court has exclusive 
original jurisdiction over both the unborn child and the expectant mother when 
an expectant mother 
habitually lacks self-control in the use of alcohol beverages, con-
trolled substances, or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 94; see Sandstad, supra note 28, at 179, 182; see also Rear-
don, supra note 81 (noting a mother charged with involuntary manslaughter for allegedly consuming 
drugs while pregnant); Associated Press, Mom gets Probation in C-Section Case, TUSCALOOSA 
NEWS, Apr. 30, 2004, at 4A (profiling woman charged with murder for delaying a Caesarean section 
that could have saved the life of one of her twins who pled guilty to child endangerment and received 
eighteen months’ probation). 
 84 See Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d. 1288, 1297 (Fla. 1992) (overturning woman’s conviction for 
delivering controlled substances to minors because she transferred illegal drugs to her fetus via the 
umbilical cord); Associated Press, supra note 83 (profiling woman charged with murder for delaying a 
Caesarean section that could have saved the life of one of her twins who pled guilty to child endan-
germent and received eighteen months’ probation). 
 85 See Kristen Burgess, Comment, Protective Custody: Will It Eradicate Fetal Abuse and Lead to 
the Perfect Womb?, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 227, 265–66 (1998); Glink, supra note 33, at 558–59. Critics 
argue that this is a decision better left to state legislatures and interpreting these statutes in a way that 
makes them applicable to fetuses frustrates legislative intent. See Burgess, supra, at 266; Glink, supra 
note 33, at 559. Other critics note that such statutory interpretation is a way of divesting pregnant 
women of the personal jurisdiction requirement that acts as a procedural safeguard. See Burgess, su-
pra. 
 86 See Stone-Manista, supra note 24, at 830; see also State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1992) (holding that transmitting drugs through umbilical cord is not grounds for prosecution 
under state drug transmission statutes because of statutory requirement that drugs be passed between 
persons “outside of their bodies”); Sheriff v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994) (holding that 
transmitting illegal substances to newborn child through the umbilical cord does not allow for prose-
cution of mother under state child endangerment statute). But see Ex Parte Ankrom, 143 So. 3d 58, 73 
(Ala. 2013), withdrawn from bound volume (applying state child endangerment statute to unborn 
fetuses, beginning from the moment of conception); Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 
1997) (upholding prosecution of new mother under state criminal child neglect statute for injuries 
resulting from mother’s prenatal substance abuse). 
 87 See WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (2009–2010). 
 88 See id. (giving courts “exclusive original jurisdiction over an unborn child alleged to be in need 
of protection or services . . . [and] exclusive original jurisdiction over the expectant mother of an un-
born child described in this section”). 
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severe degree, to the extent that there is a substantial risk that the 
physical health of the unborn child, and of the child when born, will 
be seriously affected or endangered unless the expectant mother re-
ceives prompt and adequate treatment . . . . 89 
The lack of guidance as to what is meant by a “habitual lack of self-
control” that is “exhibited to a severe degree,” or what constitutes a “sub-
stantial risk” to the health of the fetus leaves a large portion of the law up 
to the discretion of the Wisconsin judiciary.90 
II. THE MODERN PLIGHT OF PREGNANT WOMEN UNDER  
FETAL PROTECTION LAWS 
As states have transitioned from the common law approach, in which 
rights attach only to fetuses born alive, to the modern approach of enacting 
new statutes or pursuing statutory interpretations that protect fetuses, fetal 
rights have continued to increase.91 This increase in rights, however, comes at 
the expense of pregnant women.92 Fetal protection laws designed to protect the 
fetus by targeting the prenatal behavior of pregnant women conflict with estab-
lished constitutional rights of these women.93 Additionally, many scholars be-
lieve that these efforts to protect the fetus have the unfortunate side effect of 
compromising maternal health, which in turn puts fetal health at risk.94 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, §§ 2–3, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012) (federal statute 
protecting fetus from acts of violence); WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (Wisconsin has jurisdiction over unborn 
child in need of protection or services); Glink, supra note 33, at 546 (discussing the use of child abuse 
laws, controlled substance laws, usage statutes, and homicide statutes to target the behaviors of preg-
nant women). 
 92 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1130, 1136 (noting that fetal protection laws compromise preg-
nant woman’s right to privacy and endanger her health); Glink, supra note 33, at 563 (arguing that 
fetal protection laws violate equal protection clause by placing extra burdens on pregnant women, 
rather than benefits). 
 93 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no person can be deprived of “life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . [nor shall any State] deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (affirming a right to 
privacy implicit within the Constitution); Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 107; Stone-Manista, supra 
note 24, at 827. 
 94 See Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 105; Stone-Manista, supra note 24 at 830; see also Den-
ison, supra note 38, at 1112, 1130 (noting that detoxification process poses risks to maternal and fetal 
health); Eckholm, supra note 1 (discussing how the threat of incarceration/punishment discourages 
honesty with physicians and deters pregnant women from seeking prenatal care). 
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A. Infringement on the Constitutional Rights of Pregnant Women 
Fetal protection laws conflict with a pregnant woman’s established consti-
tutional rights to privacy, due process, and equal protection.95 The Supreme 
Court has recognized a right to privacy implicit within the Constitution as the 
basis for rights such as abortion.96 The due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.97 The equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection of the laws to all per-
sons.98 By intruding into private aspects of women’s pregnancies without the 
protection of procedural safeguards, fetal protection laws compromise a preg-
nant woman’s right to these critical constitutional protections.99 
1. Right to Privacy 
The right to privacy is grounded in the guarantee of liberty in the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and encompasses rights such as 
“personal autonomy” and “bodily integrity,” including the right to abortion.100 
Also protected within the right to privacy is the ability to make decisions that 
have an impact on the realms of family and marriage without any governmen-
tal intrusion.101 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 107; Denison, supra note 38, at 1129, 1136; Glink, supra 
note 33, at 563; Stone-Manista, supra note 24, at 827. 
 96 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
 97 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law”). 
 98 See id. 
 99 See Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 107; Stone-Manista, supra note 24, at 827; see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no person can be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law . . . [nor shall any State] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (right to privacy implicit within Constitution). 
 100 Glink, supra note 33, at 562; see Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. The right to personal autonomy and 
bodily integrity describes an individual’s right to have control over his or her own self, free from 
government intervention. See Kaplan, supra note 32, at 164; Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 109; 
Glink, supra note 33, at 562; Johnsen, supra note 28, at 615; see also Sandstad, supra note 28, at 195 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently upheld an individual’s right to privacy . . . .”). This right “to 
be let alone” has long been upheld by the Court. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 
(1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity 
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 
(1891) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person . . . .”). 
 101 See Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 109; Glink, supra note 33, at 562; Sandstad, supra note 
28, at 195; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (holding that the right to marry is 
included within right to privacy). While pregnancy itself has yet to be addressed by the Supreme 
Court under the privacy framework, scholars suggest that pregnancy “fits into the stage between [oth-
er] protected activities,” such as sexual intercourse and childrearing, and “logically deserves the safe-
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The Supreme Court has considered the right to privacy to be a fundamen-
tal right, which requires that courts apply strict scrutiny in analyzing laws that 
curtail the right to privacy.102 Under this standard, laws must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest.103 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
the Court analyzed the progression of the government’s interest in protecting 
the health of the mother from “legitimate” to compelling.104 Casey acknowl-
edged that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the health of 
the mother and the life of the fetus from the beginning of the pregnancy.105 
This interest becomes compelling at the point of viability.106 The Casey Court 
also concluded that the rights of the mother outweigh the interests of the gov-
ernment in protecting the health of the fetus before the fetus is viable.107 
In contrast, fetal protection laws do not afford a similar level of deference 
to the interests of pregnant women prior to the viability of the fetus.108 Fetal 
protection laws such as Wisconsin’s do not distinguish between periods of 
pregnancy the way that abortion laws must under Supreme Court precedent, 
which establishes a period during which a woman may legally choose to ter-
minate her pregnancy.109 The practical implication of this lack of distinction in 
fetal protection laws is that, under these laws, a woman could be confined or 
restricted because she is allegedly harming her fetus even when she could still 
choose to legally end her pregnancy under abortion jurisprudence.110 This sig-
nificantly compromises a pregnant woman’s constitutionally established right 
to privacy because her confinement under fetal protection laws prevents her 
                                                                                                                           
guard of privacy.” Sandstad, supra note 28, at 195–96; see Michelle D. Mills, Comment, Fetal Abuse 
Prosecutions: The Triumph of Reaction over Reason, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 1022 (1998). 
 102 DeBonis supra note 28, at 487; see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 134, 152 
n.4 (1938) (predicting the need for heightened scrutiny in cases involving fundamental rights). But see 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (replacing strict scrutiny with an “undue 
burden” standard within the limited context of abortion). 
 103 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 
(1996) (“The means chosen to accomplish the [government’s] asserted purpose must be specifically 
and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.”)); Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 109; DeBonis, 
supra note 28, at 487. 
 104 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 105 See id. 
 106 See id. at 860. 
 107 See id. at 846. 
 108 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (2009–2010) (stating that a court’s jurisdiction over fetus and 
pregnant woman not dependent on whether fetus has attained viability). 
 109 See id.; see also WIS. STAT. § 940.15 (2009–2010) (women able to receive abortion at any 
point before fetus reaches viability); Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 110 See § 48.133; see also § 940.15 (women able to receive abortion at any point before fetus 
reaches viability); Eckholm, supra note 1 (describing how Alicia was confined at fourteen weeks, 
when she could still have obtained an abortion, yet released when she was six months pregnant and 
could no longer legally receive an abortion). 
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from exerting control over her own body, and she cannot make her own choic-
es regarding her health and body.111 
Although the use of illicit drugs is not included within the right to priva-
cy, the right to privacy does protect a woman’s physical autonomy.112 Fetal 
protection laws implicate a woman’s physical autonomy because they force 
women to undergo drug treatment simply because they are pregnant.113 This 
type of physical invasion, meant to effectuate the state interest in protecting the 
fetus, is a serious physical intrusion on the privacy rights of a pregnant wom-
an.114 American common law is “quite clear” that, when one individual’s bodi-
ly integrity conflicts with the needs of another individual’s bodily integrity, 
there exists no obligation to sacrifice oneself, “even if the harm were minimal 
and the benefit to the other great.”115 Fetal protection laws undercut this notion 
by forcing a pregnant woman to undergo drug treatment for the benefit of her 
fetus.116 
2. Right to Due Process 
Lack of access to attorneys during pre-confinement hearings, the unique 
problems posed by the potentially long-lasting effects of substance use by 
pregnant women, and the lack of a knowledge or intent requirement in fetal 
protection laws all conflict with due process and present a need for procedural 
safeguards within these laws.117 Under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1136; see also Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 112 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1136–37. 
 113 See § 48.133; Denison, supra note 38, at 1136. 
 114 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1136. The law has provided violent criminal offenders with 
greater protection in the realm of personal autonomy than fetal protection laws provide pregnant 
women. Compare Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985) (holding Court would not order perfor-
mance of surgery to remove bullet from suspect’s head that would provide evidence of the crime), and 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166, 174 (1952) (holding that involuntary pumping of criminal 
suspect’s stomach to retrieve evidence violated the 14th amendment), with § 48.133 (allowing invol-
untary treatment for substance abuse for pregnant women). 
 115 Sandstad, supra note 28, at 197 (quoting Amy F. Cohen, The Midwifery Stalemate and Child-
birth Choice: Recognizing Mothers-to-Be as the Best Late Pregnancy Decisionmakers, 80 IND. L. J. 
849, 871(2005)). 
 116 See Kaplan, supra note 32, at 188; Sandstad, supra note 28, at 197. Scholars contrast the no-
tion of forcing a pregnant woman to make certain medical decisions for the good of her fetus with the 
lack of duty that runs between a parent and a child that has been born. See Kaplan, supra note 32, at 
188; Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 109. For example, a parent would not be legally required to 
donate bone marrow to his or her child, even if the bone marrow transplant was necessary to save the 
life of the child. Kaplan, supra note 32, at 188. Even a procedure as simple and non-invasive as a 
blood test cannot be forced upon a parent by his or her child. Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 109. 
 117 See § 48.133; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 270 (1970); Denison, supra note 38, at 1112, 1127; Eckholm, supra note 1. 
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erty, without due process of law . . . .”118 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
“[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be 
heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”119 In cases such 
as Alicia Beltran’s, discussed in the introduction of this Note, where a depriva-
tion of liberty hinges on contested factual premises, this principle requires both 
adequate and timely notice delineating the reasons for the proposed loss of lib-
erty, as well as the opportunity to confront any adverse witnesses and orally 
present one’s own arguments and evidence.120 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court created a test for balancing 
the governmental interest with an individual’s private interest, while protecting 
the due process rights of the individual.121 In analyzing whether existing pro-
cedural protections for deprivation of life, liberty, or property are sufficient, 
courts are directed to balance the private interest with the government inter-
est.122 Courts must first look at the private interest that will be affected by the 
governmental action.123 Second, courts must assess the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of this interest through the current procedures and the value that 
new or improved procedural safeguards would add.124 Finally, courts must bal-
ance these two factors with the government’s interest, including determining 
what, if any, burden additional procedures would place on the government.125 
The more important the privacy interest, the more procedural safeguards the 
court will require.126 Conversely, the higher the burden on the government to 
                                                                                                                           
 118 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 119 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) and Gran-
nis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). 
 120 See id. at 267–68; Eckholm, supra note 1. Within family law, the Court has been inconsistent on 
the degree of due process that is required in the context of parental rights where no loss of physical liber-
ty will occur based on the outcome of the litigation. Compare Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) 
(holding that failing to provide indigent defendant with paternity test was violation of due process), 
with Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27, 33 (1981) (holding that failing to provide 
indigent defendant with counsel was not violation of due process because no loss of physical liberty 
would occur as result of litigation). In contrast, actions involving fetal protection laws often involve a 
deprivation of liberty, so there is no reason to anticipate the Court deviating from its standard interpreta-
tion of due process with regards to these cases. See WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (2009–2010); Lassiter, 452 
U.S. at 26–27; Eckholm, supra note 1. As typically applied within the drug context, fetal protection 
laws allow states to forcibly commit pregnant women to drug rehabilitation facilities for the duration 
of the pregnancy. See § 48.133; Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 121 See Little, 452 U.S. at 13; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. In Mathews, a recipient of Social Securi-
ty disability benefits alleged a due process violation after his benefits were terminated without a hear-
ing. 424 U.S. at 324–25. 
 122 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See id. 
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provide additional procedural protections, the less likely the court will be to 
require additional procedures.127 
Because the government’s interest in promoting the health of the fetus 
conflicts with the maternal interest, the Mathews test is appropriate to apply to 
fetal protection laws.128 In applying the Mathews factors to fetal protection 
laws, the private interest at stake—loss of liberty—is an important interest that 
will tend towards the addition of procedures.129 The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that involuntary commitment produces “a massive curtailment of 
liberty” that necessitates the protections of due process.130 As Alicia Beltran’s 
case demonstrates through her forced confinement into a rehabilitation facility 
despite multiple negative drug tests, the potential risk of erroneously stripping 
pregnant women of their liberty under current procedures is likely high, and 
could be mitigated by additional procedural safeguards.131 The burden on the 
government of providing additional procedural safeguards would likely be 
minimal in situations such as Alicia’s where the government is already bearing 
the costs of providing the pregnant woman with a hearing.132 
A pregnant woman’s ability to have a lawyer present when challenging 
her confinement under fetal protection laws stems from her right to due pro-
cess under the laws.133 Alicia’s inability to have a lawyer present at her hearing 
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Goldberg v. Kelly.134 In Goldberg, 
the Court reaffirmed its statements from Powell v. Alabama, that “the right to 
be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See id. 
 128 See id. at 334–35; Kaplan, supra note 32, at 167 n.88 (discussing the nature of the conflict). 
 129 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340 (holding that termination of disability benefits did not require 
additional procedures because not based on financial need); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269 (holding that 
termination of welfare benefits required additional due process protections because potentially eligible 
recipients would have been denied means by which they live while resolution of dispute over termina-
tion was pending). In Goldberg, the Court identified the ability to cross-examine witnesses as a neces-
sity to due process when important decisions will turn on factual issues. 397 U.S. at 269. Under fetal 
protection laws, due process concerns are implicated because of the threat of the mother’s loss of 
liberty when faced with confinement. See WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (2009–2010); Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 130 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 
(1979). 
 131 See Eckholm, supra note 1. Procedural safeguards such as providing Alicia with an attorney at 
her hearing, or only applying fetal protection laws to women who test positive for drugs would have 
likely led to a different outcome for Alicia. See id. 
 132 See id. In Alicia’s case, the government already assumed the financial burden of holding a 
hearing and providing Alicia’s fetus with a lawyer at this hearing. Id. The additional cost of also 
providing Alicia with a lawyer, or simply allowing her the time necessary to consult with a lawyer 
before the hearing would be minimal, especially in light of the Wisconsin law that purports to provide 
expectant mothers with attorneys at these hearings. See WIS. STAT. § 48.23; Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 133 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270. 
 134 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270; Eckholm, supra note 1. 
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right to be heard by counsel.”135 While the Court did not hold that counsel 
must be provided in all civil cases, the Court stated that individuals “must be 
allowed to retain an attorney if [they] so desire[].”136 
Fetal protection laws involving a pregnant woman’s substance use present 
a unique need for procedural safeguards to protect maternal rights.137 Because 
drug-induced birth defects in babies have been traced to mothers’ drug con-
sumption years before conception, women who used drugs years prior to con-
ception may still give birth to a child with drug-related birth defects.138 With 
no way of definitively proving at what point in time a woman’s drug use may 
have harmed her fetus, procedural safeguards help distinguish between women 
who actively used drugs while pregnant and women whose drug consumption 
years prior to their pregnancy was the cause of fetal harm.139 Women who 
ceased drug use immediately upon learning of their pregnancy, but had already 
unknowingly harmed their fetus would also be protected through procedural 
safeguards.140 
Another element of fetal protection statutes that compromises a pregnant 
woman’s right to due process is the lack of a knowledge or intent requirement 
in the statutes.141 Without having some sort of requirement that a woman knew 
or should have known of her pregnancy before liability attaches, a woman un-
aware of her pregnancy could face convictions for fetal abuse, with no regard 
for whether her substance abuse continued after she became aware of her 
pregnancy.142 Although women using illicit drugs would already be commit-
ting a crime, women who consumed alcoholic beverages would have no reason 
to suspect they were in violation of a law, yet could still be confined under 
statutes similar to that which is in place in Wisconsin.143 
                                                                                                                           
 135 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)). 
 136Id. 
 137 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1112. 
 138 Id. at 1112 & n.63; Allen S. Goldman, Critical Periods of Prenatal Toxic Insults, in DRUG 
AND CHEMICAL RISKS TO THE FETUS AND NEWBORN 9, 10 (Richard H. Schwarz & Sumner J. Yaffe 
eds., 1980). Even if the woman never used drugs, exposure to drugs while she was in utero and her 
ovaries were developing can produce effects in her offspring. Goldman, supra, at 11. 
 139 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1112. 
 140 See id. (stating the most serious damage to long-term health and survival of fetus may occur 
during the early months of pregnancy). In Alicia’s case, because she was denied access to a lawyer at 
her hearing, she was likely unable to adequately represent her interests and challenge the critical tes-
timony of the obstetrician from the clinic that had never examined her. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 
267–68; Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 141 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (2009–2010); see Denison, supra note 38, at 1125. Women who 
conscientiously use contraception yet fall within the small percentage for whom birth control fails would 
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 142 See Denison, supra note 38,. at 1127. 
 143 See § 48.133; Denison, supra note 38, at 1127. 
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3. Right to Equal Protection 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection to all 
persons, fetal protection laws uniquely impact pregnant women.144 The equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state “shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”145 
It remains unclear, however, whether pregnant women and non-pregnant wom-
en must be treated equally under the Amendment.146 The Supreme Court con-
fronted this issue in the employment context in Geduldig v. Aiello.147 As one 
commentator notes, the holding in Geduldig circumvented equal protection by 
finding that “discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not discrimination on 
the basis of gender, but rather discrimination between pregnant and nonpreg-
nant [sic] people.”148 In 1978, Congress responded to the Court’s decision in 
Geduldig and subsequent cases by amending Title VII to include the Pregnan-
cy Discrimination Act (PDA).149 Under the PDA, discrimination on the basis 
of pregnancy is outlawed as discrimination based on sex.150 
Because the PDA was designed to address the issue of pregnancy-based 
discrimination solely in the employment context, whether the equal protection 
clause requires equal treatment of pregnant and non-pregnant women outside 
of that context is unclear.151 Women’s rights advocates argue that the Geduldig 
analysis should not be controlling outside of the workplace context, because 
such an extension “places additional burdens, not benefits, on one specific 
class of individuals—pregnant women.”152 Other advocates of a woman’s right 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Denison, supra note 38, at 1131; Glink, supra note 33, at 
563; Stone-Manista, supra note 24, at 853. 
 145 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 146 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974); Glink, supra note 33, at 562–63. 
 147 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494. In Geduldig, appellees claimed a violation of equal protection 
because a California law excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage under their disability 
insurance system. Id. at 486. The Court held for the employer. Id. at 494, 496–97. The Court affirmed 
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framework of the equal protection clause because it is not a gender based classification. See 429 U.S. 
125, 136 (1976); see Sandstad, supra note 28, at 190. 
 148 Glink, supra note 33, at 562; see Kaplan, supra note 32, at 195–96. 
 149 Sandstad, supra note 28, at 190; see Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
 150 Sandstad, supra note 28, at 190; see Pregnancy Discrimination Act. § 2000e.  
 151 See Glink, supra note 33, at 563; Sandstad, supra note 28, at 190. Cases following Geduldig 
have not addressed disparate treatment of pregnant and non-pregnant women outside of the workplace 
setting. See Glink, supra note 33, at 563. 
 152 See Glink, supra note 33 at 563. The contrasting of burdens and benefits is important to these 
advocates because Geduldig dealt with the issue of whether employers were required to provide addi-
tional benefits to pregnant women, rather than addressing any additional burdens placed on pregnant 
women. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494; Glink, supra note 33, at 563. In contrast, criminal prosecution 
of pregnant women additionally burdens pregnant women. Glink, supra note 33, at 563. An extension 
of Geduldig’s holding that pregnancy does not fall within the framework of the equal protection 
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to self-autonomy focus on the gendered aspects of pregnancy as an equal pro-
tection issue, arguing that the fundamental analysis of pregnancy-based dis-
crimination as sex-based discrimination in the PDA should apply to other are-
as.153 Because substance abuse by males has also been linked to chromosomal 
damage in offspring, the only remaining difference between female and male 
drug users is their ability to become pregnant.154 Although a male’s continued 
substance abuse would not further harm the fetus after the moment of concep-
tion, situations may likely arise where a male is providing a female with drugs, 
despite knowledge of her pregnancy.155 In such situations, holding only the 
female culpable while having no recourse against the male seems not only in-
equitable, but a violation of equal protection under the laws.156 
Fetal protection laws have an even further disparate impact on additional 
subcategories of women.157 Women of color are significantly more likely to be 
arrested and tried for drug use during pregnancy that white women.158 Poor 
women are also more likely to be prosecuted for drug use during pregnancy, 
partly because they are often treated at public hospitals and physicians are 
more likely to test them for drug use.159 Negative stereotypes based on race 
and class exacerbate this impact, making these women easy targets for prose-
cution rather than prenatal care.160 
B. Prioritizing the Fetus Compromises Maternal and Fetal Health 
The Supreme Court, in a series of cases considering abortion, has recog-
nized that a woman’s health is always paramount over the health of her fe-
tus.161 Fetal protection laws, however, can prioritize fetal health over a wom-
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417 U.S. at 494; Glink, supra note 33, at 563. 
 153 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1131; Sandstad, supra note 28, at 190. 
 154 See Goldman, supra note 138, at 11; Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 111; Denison, supra 
note 38, at 1131. 
 155 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1131–32. 
 156 See id. at 1131. 
 157 Stone-Manista, supra note 24, at 836. 
 158 Id.; see Michelle Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional 
Battlefront, 102 CAL. L. REV. 781, 873 (2014); Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 110. 
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with risks to fetal health. See Goodwin, supra note 158, at 873–74. 
 160 Goodwin, supra note 158, at 873–74.; see id. at 874. 
 161 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (holding that restrictions on abortion must maintain an excep-
tion for pregnancies endangering the life of the mother, suggesting that maternal health trumps fetal 
health); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768–69 (1986) 
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an’s health.162 Such laws compromise maternal health by discouraging women 
from disclosing information to their doctors and seeking out medical care dur-
ing their pregnancy.163 Additionally, fetal protection laws do not adequately 
protect fetal health because they protect only against a specific set of maternal 
behaviors that may cause harm to the fetus, discourage women from seeking 
vital prenatal care, and are somewhat ineffective in reducing the instance of 
alcohol and substance abuse among pregnant women.164 
Fear of prosecution under fetal protection laws may discourage women 
from seeking vital prenatal care during their pregnancy.165 Even sporadic re-
ports of pregnant women being detained may have a discouraging effect, mak-
ing pregnant women with a dependency problem or a history of drug or alco-
hol abuse too wary to attend doctor’s appointments while pregnant.166 A desire 
to avoid prosecution or confinement under these laws encourages women with 
addictions to forego medical treatment throughout their pregnancy, avoid giv-
ing birth in a hospital, or, in even more extreme cases, seek out abortions to 
terminate the fetus that could be responsible for their loss of liberty.167 Addi-
tionally, prenatal care that pregnant women with addictions may avoid could 
mitigate some of the negative side effects of drug use during a pregnancy.168 
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 162 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1112, 1130 (noting that detoxification process required by 
many fetal protection laws compromises maternal health). 
 163 See The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 26 (describing how the threat 
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 164 See The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 26; Burgess, supra note 85, at 
272; Denison, supra note 38, at 1130; Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 165 See Goodwin, supra note 158, at 872; Schroedel et al., supra note 28, at 105; Burgess, supra 
note 85, at 272; Denison, supra note 38, at 1130; Stone-Manista, supra note 24, at 830; Eckholm, 
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 166 Eckholm, supra note 1; see Burgess, supra note 85, at 273 (“[A]s prosecutors congratulate 
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nancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Stone-Manista, supra note 
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 167 See Goodwin, supra note 158, at 872; Denison, supra note 38, at 1130; Stone-Manista, supra 
note 24, at 833–34. Because of the incentive for addicted mothers to terminate their pregnancies, pro-
life groups and anti-abortion lobbies, such as Texas Right to Life, have publicly advocated against 
these prosecutions. Stone-Manista, supra note 24, at 834. 
 168 See The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 26; Eckholm, supra note 1. 
According to a 2011 report by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, mandated 
testing and reporting leads women to avoid prenatal care that “greatly reduces the negative effects of 
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Because of the concern that pregnant women will avoid prenatal care rather 
than terminate their drug use, many prominent public health and medical asso-
ciations, including the American Medical Association and the American Acad-
emy of Pediatrics, oppose criminal prosecution and punishment of pregnant 
drug users.169 
For women that choose to seek prenatal care during their pregnancy, 
scholars believe that fear of being prosecuted under fetal protection laws plays 
a negative role in the relationships they have with their doctors.170 Stories such 
as Alicia Beltran’s, where her openness and honesty with a doctor led to her 
forced stay in a rehabilitation facility, may scare similarly situated women and 
discourage them from disclosing a history of substance abuse to their doctor.171 
Without a full medical history, a doctor will not be able to provide the maxi-
mum level of care to best promote both maternal and fetal health.172 According 
to Dr. Cresta W. Jones, an obstetrician and fetal medicine specialist at the Med-
ical College of Wisconsin, allowing women to be honest leads to better out-
comes for their pregnancies.173 
While fetal protection laws are touted as ways to promote the health and 
welfare of the developing fetus, these laws instead can compromise fetal health 
during critical stages of development.174 The most vulnerable time for a fetus, 
and the most critical stage for the fetus in development, is the first few weeks 
of pregnancy, when many women would likely not know that they are preg-
nant.175 Fetal protection laws do not adequately protect fetal health during this 
stage, unless all women of childbearing age that use illicit substances are to be 
monitored, and then confined from the moment they become pregnant.176 
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drug abuse. Id. According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, medications such as methadone 
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inafter Topics in Brief].  
 174 See Burgess, supra note 85, at 267–68; Denison, supra note 38, at 1130. 
 175 See Burgess, supra note 85, at 268–69; Denison, supra note 38, at 1112. 
 176 See Burgess, supra note 85, at 268–69; Denison, supra note 38, at 1130. 
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Additionally, the detoxification process required by fetal protection laws 
can pose significant health risks to both maternal and fetal health.177 Making 
an effort to cure an addiction while pregnant could increase complications sur-
rounding the pregnancy or increase the risk of spontaneous abortion.178 Be-
cause of the risk of early labor and fetal distress, prenatal care providers rec-
ommend against traditional drug rehabilitation during the early and late stages 
of pregnancy.179 Prenatal care practitioners typically avoid prescribing detoxi-
fication for pregnant patients before the fetus is fourteen weeks along and after 
the pregnancy reaches thirty-two weeks of age.180 
Further, simply arresting and incarcerating pregnant women based on 
substance use is not guaranteed to improve the health of the fetus.181 Drugs are 
readily available in prisons and incarceration alone does not ensure that preg-
nant women will no longer have access to these harmful substances.182 Addi-
tionally, the conditions in these prisons do nothing to improve the health of the 
fetus, especially in circumstances where women give birth while in prison.183 
Studies suggest that fetal protection laws are not successful in reducing 
the incidence of alcohol or drug abuse among pregnant women.184 For exam-
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ple, according to a 2011 report by the ACOG, “incarceration and threat of in-
carceration have proved to be ineffective in reducing the incidence of alcohol 
or drug abuse.”185 While fetal protection statutes focus largely on the use of 
illicit drugs, experts now believe that the effect of illegal drug use by pregnant 
women on their developing fetuses is “generally less serious and more treata-
ble than popularly believed.”186 Other legal substances, such as tobacco, may 
have more harmful effects on the fetus than illegal drugs do, and yet those sub-
stances are generally not included within the scope of fetal protection laws.187 
In addition to compromising fetal health in these ways, fetal protection 
laws may compromise maternal health and discourage bonding between the 
mother and the fetus.188 As a result, a woman may view her developing fetus as 
something that is working against her to curtail her legal rights, thus causing 
hostility in a mother toward her fetus.189 
III. A MODIFIED STATUTORY SCHEME AND NEW FETAL HEALTH 
PROGRAMS TO END THE PROSECUTION OF PREGNANT  
WOMEN UNDER FETAL PROTECTION LAWS 
As fetal protection laws develop to address the problem of in utero fetal 
abuse, women are being stripped of their constitutional rights of privacy, due 
process, and equal protection under the law.190 In addition, these laws can 
compromise maternal health and the health of the fetus.191 The solution to this 
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problem should take two forms: modify existing fetal protection laws to better 
protect maternal rights and develop new programs to provide women positive 
incentives to promote fetal health.192 
A. Modification of Existing Fetal Protection Laws to Avoid Violating the 
Constitutional Rights of Pregnant Women 
Existing fetal protection laws must be modified to avoid compromising 
the constitutional rights of pregnant women.193 Incorporating a timeframe into 
these laws that parallels the timeline of states’ abortion laws will help remedy 
the privacy concerns associated with these laws.194 A set of statutorily defined 
procedural requirements would be a relatively simple solution to address the 
problem of existing laws being both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.195 
While fetal protection laws will still have lingering problems, these simple 
changes will correct the most flagrant flaws related to a mother’s rights to pri-
vacy, due process, and equal protection.196 
1. Modifying These Laws to Guarantee the Right to Privacy 
As outlined above, the right to privacy, grounded in the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a fundamental right.197 The Supreme Court has 
held that in the context of abortion, the rights of the mother outweigh the gov-
ernment’s interests in protecting the health of the fetus before viability.198 De-
spite this holding, fetal protection laws can deprive a woman of her liberty 
through involuntary confinement in the name of fetal health. 199 Because a wom-
an can be temporarily deprived of liberty during the same period of her pregnan-
cy in which the Court has declared her privacy interest in an abortion to be con-
trolling, fetal protection laws create an unprecedented level of protection for a 
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non-viable fetus.200 Rather than maintain the constitutional guarantee of personal 
autonomy and bodily integrity for pregnant women, fetal protection laws sacri-
fice this right for the benefit of the fetus.201 A pregnant woman is unable to exert 
control over her own body or her choices regarding her health and body, which 
unconstitutionally compromises her right to privacy.202 
To remedy this contradiction in the law, fetal protection laws should in-
corporate a timeframe during which women may face punishment or confine-
ment in treatment facilities for actions they take that may harm their fetus.203 
This timeframe should parallel the state’s abortion laws, to ensure that women 
are neither committed to rehabilitation facilities nor incarcerated for harming a 
fetus at a time in their pregnancy when they could still legally choose to termi-
nate the pregnancy.204 
2. Guaranteeing the Right to Due Process 
As previously discussed, fetal protection laws largely ignore the Four-
teenth Amendment’s due process clause, which guarantees that no state shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”205 
Instead, fetal protection laws deprive pregnant women of their liberty without 
basic procedural safeguards or determinations of how much process pregnant 
women are due.206 In addressing this problem, existing fetal protection laws 
should be modified to include basic procedural protections and impute a 
knowledge requirement into the law.207 
The first procedural protection that should be incorporated into fetal pro-
tection laws to mitigate due process concerns is a requirement that pregnant 
women have access to a lawyer before any deprivation of liberty.208 As deline-
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ated in Goldberg v. Kelly, one of the basic procedural safeguards required be-
fore a deprivation of liberty may occur is the opportunity for a meaningful 
hearing.209 When states are eager to confine women to rehabilitation facilities 
and even provide their fetuses with legal guardians, there is a high risk of a 
pregnant woman’s liberty interests being underrepresented unless she is also 
provided a lawyer.210 If all other parties involved have lawyers, pregnant wom-
en will simply be unable to raise sufficient legal arguments to contradict the 
claims of the state without the assistance of legal counsel.211 By denying them 
access to counsel, the state impedes the ability of these women to effectively 
argue against their loss of liberty.212 
The second procedural protection that should be incorporated into exist-
ing fetal protection laws is a requirement for affirmative evidence that a preg-
nant woman is an active substance abuser before any loss of her liberty oc-
curs.213 Urine tests that are positive for the presence of drugs would be the 
strongest evidence, but it is also possible to imagine situations where other 
evidence, such as oral testimony about the pregnant woman’s substance use, 
would be sufficient.214 Fetal protection laws are designed with the purpose of 
protecting the fetus from the mother’s potentially harmful behavior during 
pregnancy.215 Women who are not actively engaging in substance abuse, how-
ever, should not be deprived of their liberty simply because they have a history 
of substance abuse.216 
These two additional procedural protections would help to fix the prob-
lem of these laws being over-inclusive, sweeping up women who are not ac-
tively engaging in substance abuse in the broad strokes of these fetal protection 
laws.217 If Alicia Beltran had been granted a lawyer at her hearing, the lawyer 
would have been able to raise due process concerns, most notably that the state 
of Wisconsin was seeking to deny Alicia her liberty without demonstrable evi-
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dence of drug use.218 The use of drug tests would have bolstered Alicia’s ar-
gument that she was not in violation of the statute.219 
In addition to procedural protections, imputing a knowledge requirement 
into existing fetal protection laws would further address due process con-
cerns.220 Strict liability statutes such as Wisconsin’s raise due process issues by 
failing to state that knowledge of one’s pregnancy is required to violate the 
statute.221 Liability under the law should not attach until a woman knows, or 
should know, of her pregnancy.222 Actual knowledge of a pregnancy would be 
relatively easy to demonstrate through medical records documenting that the 
woman’s doctor confirmed her pregnancy or a woman’s statements to friends 
and family members that she is pregnant.223 The stage of pregnancy when 
knowledge should become constructive, meaning a woman should know that 
she is pregnant, is slightly less clear.224 This problem is better addressed by 
legislatures than through interpretation by courts, because legislatures have the 
ability to consult experts in the field for assistance in drafting legislation.225 
Imputing a knowledge requirement into existing fetal protection laws rather 
than interpreting them as strict liability statutes would help correct the due 
process concerns with these statutes and prevent women from being liable un-
der these laws until they knew or should have known of their pregnancies.226 
3. Right to Equal Protection 
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no state will “deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” provides that all 
persons similarly situated will be treated the same.227 Fetal protection laws 
compromise a pregnant woman’s right to equal protection because pregnant 
women, non-pregnant women, and males are all capable of harming the fetus 
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by enabling the drug use of the pregnant woman.228 Thus, in order to provide 
pregnant women with the equal protection afforded to them by the Constitu-
tion, fetal protection laws should be altered so that they apply to both pregnant 
women and non-pregnant persons.229 
There are several ways that a gender-neutral statute could be construct-
ed.230 One approach would be to punish any person who knowingly provides a 
pregnant woman with the harmful substances identified in the statutes.231 This 
approach, however, creates a wealth of prosecution problems.232 Whether a 
person knew the individual was pregnant, or far enough along in her pregnancy 
for liability to attach, and the ability of the woman to obtain the substance in 
question from other sources would likely become major obstacles to prosecu-
tion of non-pregnant persons for such crimes.233 Another statutory approach 
available would be to punish the actions of men who damage offspring by 
passing on defects through their semen at the time of conception.234 The esti-
mated period during which this can occur, however, is sixty-four days, leaving 
such a statute open to the criticisms that it is a violation of due process to pun-
ish someone for actions taken so long before conception.235 Such a gender-
neutral approach, while addressing the equal protection problems of fetal pro-
tection laws, would increase the due process problems created by these laws.236  
4. Lingering Problems with Fetal Protection Laws 
Although many modifications may be made to existing fetal protection 
laws in order to mitigate the constitutional violations, these modifications still 
cannot correct all of the problems associated with these laws.237 First, the right 
to privacy violation associated with the physical intrusion of pregnant wom-
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en’s bodies cannot realistically be avoided.238 Without this portion of the law, 
fetal protection laws would have no enforceability, as there would be no real 
consequence for violating the law.239 Additionally, the under-inclusivity of 
laws aimed at protecting fetuses from the mother’s behavior cannot rationally 
be avoided.240 The wealth of legal activities that pregnant women could engage 
in or legal substances that they could consume that could potentially cause any 
amount of harm to the fetus is too broad for a law to incorporate all of these 
harms.241 Unless a law made a pregnant woman culpable for all possible activi-
ties she could engage in that go against the recommendations of her doctor, 
these laws will always be under-inclusive.242 Because statutory modifications 
alone will not be able to solve the problems associated with fetal protection 
laws, new programs should be created to promote fetal health.243 
B. Creating New Programs to Promote Fetal Health While Respecting the 
Rights of Pregnant Women 
In addition to these constitutional concerns, protection of the fetus 
through forced rehabilitation and confinement of pregnant women is not an 
effective means of preventing substance abuse during pregnancy or promoting 
fetal health.244 Already willing to violate drug laws, pregnant women who were 
previous or are current drug users are unlikely to respond to additional penal-
ties.245 Rather than discouraging women from abusing drugs and alcohol while 
pregnant, states with fetal protection laws are actually discouraging women 
from seeking vital prenatal care that would mitigate some of the negative ef-
fects that substance abuse has on a developing fetus.246 
                                                                                                                           
 238 See, e.g., § 48.133; see also Denison, supra note 38, at 1137. 
 239 See, e.g., § 48.133; see also Denison, supra note 38, at 1139. 
 240 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1122. 
 241 See id. (noting that riding on amusement park rides despite signs warning pregnant women not 
to ride or driving recklessly could endanger fetus); Nutrition During Pregnancy, supra note 67 (rec-
ommending pregnant women do not consume sushi made with raw fish). 
 242 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1122; Nutrition During Pregnancy, supra note 67. 
 243 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1139; Glink, supra note 33, at 574; see also Topics in Brief, 
supra note 174 (explaining that providing incentives for maintaining abstinence from drugs “in-
crease[s] treatment retention and prolong[s] abstinence in pregnant women with cocaine, opiate, and 
nicotine dependence” more than standard treatments). 
 244 See The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 25, at 200; Eckholm, supra 
note 1. 
 245 See Denison, supra note 38, at 1139. 
 246 See WIS. STAT. § 48.133 (2009–2010); Topics in Brief, supra note 173. Medications such as 
buprenorphine and methadone treatment plans can improve both the maternal and fetal health conse-
quences of heroin abuse, when combined with prenatal care throughout pregnancy. See Topics in 
Brief, supra note 173. 
2015] Fetal Protection Laws Strip Constitutional Rights of Pregnant Women 149 
Instead of enacting fetal protection laws, a better solution to the problem 
would be creating new programs designed to provide pregnant women with 
positive incentives to seek prenatal care and substance abuse counseling.247 
Such programs are likely to be as effective, if not more effective, than the cur-
rent statutory schemes of forced rehabilitation, and would avoid compromising 
the health or constitutional rights of women.248 These programs should incor-
porate two main components: education and positive incentives for seeking 
voluntary prenatal care.249 
Education about the risks of using certain substances while pregnant may 
incentivize some women to avoid harmful substance use during pregnancy.250 
Especially for users of legal substances made illegal by fetal protection stat-
utes, such as alcohol, casual users may be likely to cease their substance use 
for the duration of the pregnancy once they become aware of the extent of 
harmful effects the substance may cause.251 Information about the effects of 
drugs and alcohol on a fetus could be provided to women at prenatal care facil-
ities and drug rehabilitations centers, and proactively taught to students as a 
portion of high school health classes.252 The most effective route for dissemi-
nation of this information would come through state statutes that require the 
distribution of this information at all state facilities and in public high 
schools.253 While not all women would respond to this information or cease 
illicit substance use or abuse because of it, this is still a worthwhile avenue 
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because some individuals may respond to the information, and further its dis-
semination does not compromise the constitutional rights of pregnant women 
in any way.254 
In addition to education, states should also offer several forms of positive 
incentives for women to seek voluntary prenatal care.255 First, simply increas-
ing the number of outpatient treatment programs available to pregnant women 
would likely increase the number of women that utilize such programs.256 Cur-
rently, only a minority of drug treatment programs accepts pregnant women, 
and even fewer give these women priority over other patients.257 Of those pro-
grams that do accept pregnant women, the treatment is not always appropriate 
for an expectant mother.258 Unlike patients in full-time inpatient treatment pro-
grams, women involved with outpatient treatment could maintain their jobs 
and other important elements of their lifestyle while still getting the treatment 
they need.259 Additionally, women similar to Alicia Beltran who have a history 
of substance abuse but no longer abuse controlled substances could turn to 
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outpatient treatment programs to make sure they do not have a relapse due to 
the stress of pregnancy.260 
A second positive incentive that would encourage women to seek vital 
prenatal care is offering these women immunity from prosecution under fetal 
protection laws, or other laws applied to the prenatal substance use of women, 
if they seek prenatal care throughout their pregnancy.261 A woman should re-
ceive immunity for the duration of her pregnancy, as long as she attends regu-
larly scheduled prenatal visits with her obstetrician throughout her pregnan-
cy.262 This prenatal care would be vital to helping to correct some of the ad-
verse effects of substance use during pregnancy, and would also serve as a 
means of educating women about the harmful effects their substance use could 
have on their developing fetuses.263 Offering immunity to these women would 
correct the disincentive to seek prenatal care created by fetal protection laws, 
and instead encourage pregnant women to seek prenatal care and cultivate an 
open and honest relationship with their doctors.264 
CONCLUSION 
As states seek statutory solutions to address the problem of in utero fetal 
abuse, the constitutional rights of pregnant women are becoming increasingly 
compromised. Through fetal protection laws, the right to privacy that pregnant 
women have has been all but taken away, as they suffer an invasion of their 
personal autonomy and bodily integrity and are, ironically, forcibly confined 
for harming a fetus that they still have a legal right to abort. In these situations, 
a woman’s constitutional right to due process is annihilated, as she is afforded 
no procedural protections before suffering a loss of liberty. Further, her right to 
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equal protection under the laws disappears, as men and non-pregnant women 
can also cause harm to a developing fetus, yet these classes avoid any liability 
for such harm. 
In addition to this loss of constitutional rights, fetal protection laws com-
promise the health of both the mother and her fetus. Forced detoxification cre-
ates a high level of risk to both maternal and fetal health. Additionally, women 
are dissuaded from seeking prenatal care or from being honest with their pre-
natal care provider if they know they could face incarceration. This inhibits a 
doctor’s ability to offset some of the side effects of prenatal drug use, creating 
an even greater harm to both mother and fetus. 
Simple procedural protections guaranteeing that no woman will be denied 
her liberty under fetal protection laws without having access to a lawyer and 
without evidence showing that she is an active drug user are vital to ensuring 
pregnant women receive constitutional protections. Additionally, educating 
women about the harmful effects of prenatal drug use and creating positive 
incentives for pregnant women to seek prenatal care will promote fetal health 
while maintaining the constitutional rights of pregnant women. 
When Alicia Beltran was forcibly confined to a rehabilitation facility for a 
seventy-eight day stay for a drug problem that she no longer had, she was af-
forded none of the procedural protections guaranteed to her under the Constitu-
tion. Enacting basic procedural protections and creating programs designed to 
provide pregnant women with positive incentives for seeking prenatal care will 
ensure that situations similar to Alicia’s do not happen again. 
